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Introduction
In Dalen et al (2010) we estimated the choice between brand-name and generic drugs based on cross-section data. We extracted the entire population of prescriptions in Simastatine. From the model we derived elasticities of the probabilities of shifting from brand to generics with respect to the price of generics and of the probabilities of shifting from generics to brand with respect to the brand price. The average of the elasticities over patients and periods were -0.27 and -0.46 respectively which are not that different from the estimates of the price elasticity derived from the cross-section estimates referred to above which also covered not only statines but 22 other substances.
In addition to the expected price effects we found that the older a male doctor is the more likely it is that he continues to prescribe the brand-name product. The dynamic model allows for taste persistence and the correlation of is calculated across patients and across time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 gives the data, estimates are given in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
The model
The model we employ is based on a dynamic choice model developed by Dagsvik (2002) . Let U nj (t) denote the utility of patient n of using drug j at time t. j= B(brandname), G(generics). Let B nt be the choice set. We will assume that   nj nt
be the period-specific utility in contrast to U nj (t) which are utilities that account for "taste-persistence". The nj (t)  are assumed to be independent of v nj (t) and they are assumed to be iid extreme value distributed, that is nj Pr( (t) x) exp( exp(x)).
   
The model extends the common logit model to deal with correlation in preferences or rather taste persistence. It should be noted that this is not the same as state dependence.
With the latter the choice you have made in the past has a direct impact on the current choices. This is not the case here; the assumption is simply that preferences may be correlated. In Dagsvik (2002) it is shown that
The coefficient θ may be interpreted as a preference discount factor:
If θ=0 there is a complete strong taste persistence, and if θ=∞ there is no taste persistence at all and nj nj nj
The expected value of U nj (t) is given by Q nBGt = probability that patient n transit from Brand-name drug in period t-1 to Generics in period t Q nBBt = probability that patient n stay on Brand-name drug in period t-1 and in period t Q nBBt = 1-Q nBGt Q nGBt = probability that patient n transit from Generics in period t-1 to Brand-name drug in period t Q nGGt = probability that patient n stay on Generic in period t-1 and in period t Q nGGt = 1-Q nGBt .
The transition probabilities have the following structure: 
The deterministic part of the utility function, v jnt , j=B,G is assumed to depend linearly on the price of the drug, age and gender of patient. Because of the loyalty among patients and doctors we expect that  n will have a low value indicating strong taste persistence.  n may depend on characteristics such as age and gender of doctors and patients. However, here we assume it to be a constant.
t 0 =date of entry of the drug to the market. Because the data we use are detailed register data that started in January 2004, t 0 is set equal to this date.
The model is estimated by a standard maximum likelihood procedure. The likelihood is: 
1if transition from Generic to Brand z 0 otherwise
We assume that the deterministic part of the utility function depends on the price of the drug, and the interaction between age and gender of both patient and doctor. We expect that price has a negative impact on demand. Furthermore we expect that male patient, in particular when they are getting older are less likely to make generic substitution, and that the describing doctor is less likely to accept generic substitution if they are males, in particular when they are getting older. Thus we assume: The Database monitors all drugs that are dispensed by prescription in Norway, and provides information about the patient (age, sex, and insurance status), the physician (age, sex, and speciality), the pharmacy (location), and the dispensed drug (price, package size, strength, product name). Using other sources of information provided by the Norwegian Medicines Control Authority (list of pharmacies and a list of drugs approved for the Norwegian market), we get additional information about pharmacy ownership, identity of the main wholesaler and producer name and price of the drugs. The latter is used to identify brand-name drugs and generics.
In the data set only the price of the drug chosen (p_dd) is reported that may be brand or generic. To generate the price of the drug not chosen (p_not) we have done as follows.
First we generated a dummy variable (b_chosen) that identify if the drug is brand or generic. It is equal to one if the drug name is Pravachol or Zocor (alone or in combination); atc_code is C10AA03 or C10AA001, 0 otherwise. Then, we generated the 8 mean price (p_ddd) over the chosen drug that has same atc_code, same strength (strength), same pharmacy identifier (id_n_ph) and same date of transaction (months). At last we generated the alternative price (p_not) equal to the mean price just computed, conditioned on b (1 or 0). It happens that there are groups in which only brand is chosen or only generic is chosen. In these cases we could not compute the alternative price and we then set p_not equal to missing. It also happens that in some groups there is just only one observation useful to compute the average. Also in this case we set the value of p_not to missing. To sum up: p_generic = p_ddd*(1-b_choicen) + p_not*b_choicen; p_brand = p_ddd*b_choicen + p_not*(1-b_choicen);
where: p_generic is the price of the generic drug; p_brand is the price of the brand drug, p_ddd is the price of the chosen drug and p_not is the price of the drug not chosen, and b_choice is a dummy variable equal to 1 if brand is chosen and 0 otherwise. The following statistics, show that at minimum a patient has 28 prescriptions, and at maximum 52 prescriptions. The number of prescriptions by patient is not equal to the number of months since there may be more than one prescription per month. Table 2 gives the description of the variable while Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics. Table 4 gives the estimates. We observe that price has the expected negative impact on demand and the impact is significant different from zero. The interaction of male doctors and age has a positive and significant impact on the use of brand products. Patient's age interacted with gender has no significant impact
Results
The preference discount factor is positive and significant which indicates that preferences are correlated over time, given the covariates in the deterministic part of the utility function. From Table 5 we observe that all elasticites have the expected sign, which of course come the fact that β 1 <0. The only two sizeable elasticities are the most important ones. The elasticity of transiting from brand to generics (statines) with respect to the generic price is on average equal to -0.2732. The elasticity of transiting from generics to brand (statines) with respect to the brand price is on average equal to -0.4625. The brand price has thus a stronger impact on the the transition than the generic price. In Figur 1 we show how the elasticities vary across the 37 months. We observe that the two most important elesticities referred to above indicate that price responses were strongest at the beginning of the period (May 2004) and at around month 20 (January 2006) Table 5 . Elastisites of the transition probabilites with respect to prices; averaged over patients and periods. a) for transition from brand to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq14 a) b) from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 14 b) c) for transition from brand to generic as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price (see eq. 14 c) d) from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price (see eq. 14 d) e) for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq 14 e) f) from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 14 f) g) for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price (see eq. 14 g) h) from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price increase (see eq. 14 h) 14 c) d) from brand to brand as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price (see eq. 14 d) e) for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq.
14e) f) from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in generic drug price (see eq. 14 f) g) for transition from generic to brand as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price (see eq.
14 g) h) from generic to generic as a consequence of an increase in brand drug price increase (see eq. 14 h) 
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In Table 6 we report the mean of the correlation of utilites across patients (and time). When the drug type is the same, the correlation is mainly due to the coefficient θ, the preference discount factor. When the drug types are different (B and G) the correlation is also affected by the fact that the characteristics of the different drug types differ. Figure 2 gives the variation across all 109 patients. Table 7 report the same correlation across time and Figure 3 show how these correlations varied over the 37 months. 
Conclusions
Using an extensive longitudinal dataset extracted from the Norwegian Prescription Database persistence and is estimated on panel data. We find that prices have a negative impact on transitions in the sense that an increase in the brand price will reduce the transition from generics to brand and likewise an increase in the generic price will reduce the transition from brand to generics.
